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91.
William Stanford 《Operations Research Letters》2010,38(2):94-96
We consider the set of all m×n bimatrix games with ordinal payoffs. We show that on the subset E of such games possessing at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, both players prefer the role of leader to that of follower in the corresponding Stackelberg games. This preference is in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance by leader payoffs of follower payoffs. It follows easily that on the complement of E, the follower’s role is preferred in the same sense. Thus we see a tendency for leadership preference to obtain in the presence of multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in the underlying game. 相似文献
92.
L.J. Alvarez-Vázquez 《Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics》2010,234(7):2193-2201
In this paper we present an application of optimal control theory of partial differential equations combined with multi-objective optimization techniques to formulate and solve an economical-ecological problem related to the management of a wastewater treatment system. The problem is formulated as a parabolic multi-objective optimal control problem, and it is studied from a non-cooperative point of view (looking for a Nash equilibrium), and also from a cooperative point of view (looking for Pareto-optimal solutions “better” than the Nash equilibrium). In both cases we state the existence of solutions, give a useful characterization of them, and propose a numerical algorithm to solve the problem. Finally, a numerical experience for a real world situation in the estuary of Vigo (NW Spain) is presented. 相似文献
93.
94.
本文研究了Heston随机波动模型下两个投资人之间的随机微分投资组合博弈问题。假设金融市场上存在价格过程服从常微分方程的无风险资产和价格过程服从Heston随机波动率模型的风险资产。该博弈问题被构造成两个效用最大化问题,每个投资者的目标是最大化终止时刻个人财富与竞争对手财富差的效用。首先,我们应用动态规划原理,得出了相应值函数所满足的HJB方程。然后,得到了在幂期望效用框架下非零和博弈的均衡投资策略和值函数的显式表达。最后,借助数值模拟,分析了模型中的参数对均衡投资策略和值函数的影响,从而为资产负债管理提供一定的理论指导。 相似文献
95.
The well-known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results report that in this scheme the classical NE remains intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game. In contrast, we show here that interestingly in this scheme a non-classical solution for the ESS emerges for the quantum PD. 相似文献
96.
Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A
1,A
2,,A
n
, and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a
1,a
2,,a
n
) of the players. If the payoff to each player i is 1 or 0 according to whether or not the stochastic process of states stays forever in a given Borel set G
i
, then there is an -equilibrium for every >0.
AMS (1991) subject classification: 60G40, 91A60, 60E15, 46A55. 相似文献
97.
Giulio?CodognatoEmail author Sayantan?GhosalEmail author 《International Journal of Game Theory》2003,31(4):493-498
In this paper, we generalize the exitence result for pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games. By working directly on integrals of pure strategies, we also generalize, for the same class of games, the existence result for undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria even though, in general, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria may fail to be weakly compact.
Received August 2001 相似文献
98.
Mufa Chen 《数学学报(英文版)》1999,15(3):353-370
This paper deals with the Nash inequalities and the related ones for general symmetric forms which can be very much unbounded.
Some sufficient conditions in terms of the isoperimetric inequalities and some necessary conditions for the inequalities are
presented. The resulting conditions can be sharp qualitatively as illustrated by some examples. It turns out that for a probability
measure, the Nash inequalities are much stronger than the Poincaré and the logarithmic Sobolev inequalities in the present
context.
Research supported in part by NSFC (No. 19631060), Math. Tian Yuan Found., Qiu Shi Sci. & Tech. Found., RFDP and MCME 相似文献
99.
A recursive method is developed for the solution of coupled algebraic Riccati equations and corresponding linear Nash strategies of weakly interconnected systems. It is shown that the given algorithm converges to the exact solution with the rate of convergence ofO(2), where is a small coupling parameter. In addition, only low-order systems are involved in algebrdic computations; the amount of computations required does not grow per iteration and no analyticity assumption is imposed on the system coefficients.This work was supported by Rutgers University Research Council under Grant No. 2-02188. 相似文献
100.
C. Le Van 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》1980,30(1):33-44
We define the degree of a family of convex functionsf
x, wherex
, and prove that, if this degree is different from zero, one has at least one Nash equilibrium point in . This is a criterion of localization of such equilibrium points. 相似文献